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ILLNESS IS WORK: Revisiting the concept of illness careers and recognizing the identity work of 
patients with ME/CFS 
The concept of careers has an extensive history in the sociology of health and illness. Among other things, the 
notion of a career has been used to describe the changing identities of patients diagnosed with mental illness, to 
identify distinct stages in the progression of various illnesses, and to recognize the cooperative efforts of 
hospitalized patients. However, the career concept may be reanalyzed as part of an analytical metaphor that 
makes salient both the agency of people with illnesses and the social structures in which they are enmeshed. This 
metaphor, ILLNESS IS WORK, can valorize and aid understanding of the identity work and actions of patients with 
chronic illnesses, particularly illnesses with a low degree of social recognition and medical prestige such as myalgic 
encephalopathy and chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS).  
Keywords: Illness career, chronic illness, metaphor theory, ME/CFS, identity, disease prestige  
Illness careers in the sociology of health and illness 
The concept of careers definitively entered the sociology of health and illness in 1961, through Erving 
Goffman’s Asylums. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, there are two main meanings of the 
term career, one of goal-directed and one of neutral progression through time: of an occupation with 
opportunities for progress or the time spent in the commitment to such an occupation, and of simple 
progression through history. In Asylums, Goffman observes a contemporary shift from the first 
meaning to the second, and that the term career can have a useful analytical function as a tool of 
typology, i.e. when “unique outcomes are neglected in favor of such changes over time as are basic 
and common to the members of a social category, although occurring independently to each of them” 
(Goffman, 1961, p. 127). In this view, a “career” as a mental patient is not something at which 
individuals succeed or fail, though it is a progression through different stages of social meaning.  
Goffman adopted the term career not only because its “neutral progression” sense made it apt for 
social taxonomy, but because it had another duality of meaning that united internal and external 
aspects of identity formation. Unique individuals have uniquely personal careers, but a career is 
simultaneously a public fact subject to public regulation, which means that a well-developed concept 
of career “[…] allows one to move back and forth between the personal and the public, between the 
self and its significant society, without having to rely overly for data upon what the person says he 
thinks he imagines himself to be” (Goffman, 1961, p. 127). As applied to “mental patients” and 
further specified as “moral career”, it describes the way that people’s standards for understanding 
and judging themselves change when they are institutionalized in mental hospitals;  as an observable, 
typical pattern of reaction to external, institutional circumstances, this concept of “career” works to 
bring out otherwise inaccessible analytical objects.  
Subsequent sociological uses of the career concept have prioritized the reactive, “neutral progression” 
meaning. Use of the alternative, “goal-directed progression” sense of career is often tinged with 
irony, as when it is applied in the analysis of marginal or unconventional jobs, criminal pursuits, and 
drug use, in addition to work in the tradition of Asylums (Aneshensel, 2013). This tendency includes 
the development of the career concept relative to somatic chronic illness, where it has been used to 
describe stages of deterioration and institutional descent (Fisher, 1987; Price, 1996), though also to 
make visible the institutionally unrecognized work performed by hospitalized patients (Strauss, 
Fagerhaugh, Suczek, & Wiener, 1982). Here, too, career is used in its “neutral progression” sense, to 
distinguish stages in the life course of individuals with particular chronic illnesses. Goffman’s use of 
ILLNESS IS WORK 
 
 2 
the concept remains influential. For Sim & Madden (2008), different stages form a career since they 
carrying different meanings for patients and the people with whom they interact. In the sociology of 
health and illness, then, it seems at the career concept, though it has to some degree been used to 
account for the work and recognize the agency of patients, remains chiefly taxonomic and typological, 
in that it is used to describe successive stages in illness development through which patients pass.  
There is a case, however, for reinvigorating the “goal-directed progression” sense of the term, in 
order to better understand how patients actively seek meaningful identities for themselves over time. 
This entails a conceptual and analytical shift, away from institutional frameworks and towards 
individuals’ life-worlds. Illness careers – the central term in this essay – are dynamic experiential 
trajectories that encompass many social arenas, though they are certainly shaped by institutions, as 
well as by other aspects of medical discourse. With this shift, the illness career concept can help 
explain the activities and attitudes of some patients with chronic illness, particularly those who strive 
for meaning in the face of diagnostic ambiguity, those who have received an epistemologically or 
institutionally problematic diagnosis, and those who have a diagnosis with a low degree of social 
recognition and medical prestige. All three factors are present in the case of myalgic encephalopathy 
and chronic fatigue syndrome; here, patients’ attempts to make meaning by advancing their illness 
careers may also help explain the sometimes very fraught relationships between such patients and 
health professionals.  
Individual agency and structural instability: The case of ME/CFS  
The “goal-directed progression” sense of illness careers may appear incompatible with the view of 
illness as the result of external and uncontrollable events. Viewing a career as a goal-directed 
progression that can succeed as well as fail entails seeing some degree both of agency for the person 
in question and of malleability in that person’s social environment. Those circumstances sometimes 
apply, but not always. The effects of some illnesses vary more with patient lifestyle choices than 
others, while a greater range of treatment strategies is available for some illnesses than for others. 
Moreover, an illness need not always be diagnosed in the same way. 
Each of these three factors apply in a particular case, that of the diagnostic complex known as 
myalgic encephalopathy and chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS), which will serve here as an 
exemplar for the significance of illness careers. The choice of ME/CFS as an exemplar derives from 
the empirical background for this essay, namely an investigation into disease prestige and informal 
medical priorities in Norway.  Particular attention was directed by this author at chronic illnesses and 
permanent impairments. Previous work shows that these categories are often seen by the medical 
community as having low status and prestige (Album & Westin, 2008). Surveys of people familiar 
with the field of impairment and chronic illness [BLINDED REFERENCE 2015], and studies of the 
discourse and diagnostic systems of ME/CFS [BLINDED REFERENCE 2013 AND 2014], suggest that the 
conditions of both a malleable environment and a degree of personal agency are present in the case 
of ME/CFS. Put differently, with this diagnostic complex it is possible as well as conducive to insight 
to talk about illness careers in the “goal-directed progression” sense.  
The scope for individual agency derives in part from diagnostic ambiguity. The label ME/CFS may 
refer to a single, poorly understood disease, but may also refer to a set of different diseases that 
have overlapping symptoms but cannot (yet) be clearly distinguished from each other (Jason, 
Sunnquist, Brown, & Reed, 2015; Jason, Taylor, Plioplys, Stepanek, & Shlaes, 2002). Many patients 
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who have an illness that relates to the ME/CFS diagnostic complex, i.e. that have symptoms 
consistent with either ME or CFS, have over the last few decades effectively been faced with the 
decision to accept, reject, and identify or not identify with one of several diagnostic labels. This 
decision is not of course theirs exclusively, but the combination of a wide range of available clinical 
opinion, many different sets of diagnostic criteria, and uncertain courses of progression and 
treatment, means that the decision process is unusually ambiguous.  
From the same set of circumstances derives a degree of structural malleability. In Norway, the largest 
patients’ rights organization in the ME/CFS field strongly advocates not only consistent use of the ME 
label rather than CFS, but also an emphasis on the purely somatic character of the (presumed) 
underlying disease (The Norwegian ME Association, 2012). Within medicine, there are multiple 
etiological hypotheses about ME as well as CFS; patients’ rights organizations and individual patients, 
next-of-kin, and activists regularly engage in the etiological debates. As an example, for people who 
endorse a somatic explanation, one of the most problematic figures in the ME/CFS field is the 
psychiatrist Simon Wessely, who has argued for some time that there are strong cultural historical 
links between ME/CFS and neurasthenia, a disease prevalent in the 19th century and associated with 
the emergence of neurology, but since relegated to the edges of psychosomatic medicine (Wessely, 
1990). By contrast, recent research based on an autoimmune hypothesis has been endorsed, 
promoted, and crowdfunded by the ME/CFS patient community in Norway (Gjerpe, 2013).  
In short, ME/CFS is highly contested, and lies at the intersection of the interests of various medical 
disciplines, medical bureaucracies, and patients’ organizations. It therefore also constitutes an arena 
where individuals with relevant chronic illness may perceive that diagnoses and even the 
epistemology of their illness in flux. They are faced, in a somewhat more literal way than the words 
initially suggest, with the prospect of having to build an illness career. The question of what 
constitutes criteria for career success or failure can partly be answered with the concept of disease 
prestige. 
Disease prestige and hierarchies of valuation 
The term disease prestige was coined to describe the informal hierarchical ranking of diseases among 
doctors (Album & Westin, 2008). Doctors consistently rank some diseases as more prestigious than 
others. Prestigious diseases appear to be related to medical specialties with high occupational 
prestige, but both the medical specialties and the diseases are in turn related to particular features 
of the diseases’ its location in the body and its typical patient. High-prestige diseases are often 
located in specific organs high up in the body, particularly the brain or the heart, while low-prestige 
diseases are often located low in the body or not in a particular organ. High-prestige diseases often 
strike patients that are young and male, while low prestige diseases are more often typified by older, 
female patients. Low-prestige diseases are more often chronic and not acutely life-threatening.  
Not only are some conditions seen as more prestigious than others, but different names for similar 
symptom clusters may carry different levels of prestige: more clinical-sounding diagnostic labels 
connote higher prestige (Jason et al., 2002). This, too, may contribute to the perception of structural 
malleability. Studies in the sociology of diagnosis remind us that diagnoses are not static categories, 
but change over time in accordance with medical as well as non-medical developments (Brown, 1990, 
1995; Jutel, 2009, 2015). People who are chronically ill, and this appears very much to be the case 
with ME/CFS patients, may be aware not only that the kind of illness they are recognized as having 
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will influence the kind of attitudes they will encounter and the treatment they will receive, but that 
alternatives are possible. 
In some cases prestige is not in itself a very important factor, because it is impossible for patients to 
change both the kind of illness they have and the prestige level with which it is associated. The first 
of these facts will be changed mainly in cases of misdiagnosis, while the second fact will likely change 
rather slowly. There are cases in which diseases gradually lose their cultural stigma, with cancer as 
perhaps the most salient example (Mukherjee, 2010), but prestige levels appear to be sociocultural 
constructs that are relatively stable over time [BLINDED REFERENCE 1990, 2008 AND 2015]. In cases 
where this holds, disease prestige may appear a function mostly of the cultural valorization of certain 
properties: masculinity, organ functions such as cognition, medico-technical expertise, the drama of 
life-and-death situations, etcetera. This makes the issue of illness careers for individuals, if not moot, 
then at reducible to the “neutral progression” sense of the term. But there are other cases. 
ME/CFS represents a different set of circumstances. Here, with diseases that have low prestige and 
are linked to chronic illness, to patients with lower social status, and to ambiguous etiologies that 
may have psychosomatic components, higher disease prestige and a successful illness career may, in 
lieu of an actual cure, be viewed as a legitimate goal both structurally and for individuals. Under such 
conditions, it may be deemed strategic to make explicit comparisons between patients from one’s 
own diagnostic group and patients with other diagnoses. Of course, an overriding motivation for 
patients with ME/CFS, as for all other patients, is to get effective treatment. ME/CFS is notable 
mainly for the comparisons made with diagnoses that are generally considered more severe, such as 
cancer:  
Cancer and autoimmune disease patients get Rituximab every three to six months to 
maintain their healthy condition. I know that my time being well is limited, and I’m using all 
my regained health to make sure the science continues.’ (Gjerpe, 2013) 
Illness as metaphor: The function of analytical comparisons 
We should remind ourselves that the use of the term career in the field of health and illness is usually 
– though not necessarily – a metaphor. People can quite literally make a career out of being ill by 
drawing on their experience, e.g. as patient experts and collaborators, as speakers, and as authors. 
However, such literal illness careers are circumscribed in ways that do not apply to a career as, say, a 
lawyer. They rarely provide a full income, there are far less defined levels of competency, and the 
role of “professional patient” cannot exist independently of personal biography in the same way as 
the role of “legal professional”. The primary sense of career, i.e. an occupational undertaking with 
the possibility of advancement, is therefore most useful in the effort to understand the experience of 
being ill by way comparing and contrasting certain aspects of the two topics, not by positing a full 
identification of the two.  
Another way to phrase this analytical operation – selective comparison and contrast – is to borrow 
the terminology of metaphor theory (Kövecses & Csábi, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & 
Turner, 1989), where metaphor is understood as a cognitive connection between one cognitive 
domain and another. The term career belongs to the domain of work and professions; when it is used 
outside that domain, the use is metaphorical, whether the new domain is that of criminal pursuits or 
ILLNESS IS WORK 
 
 5 
that of illness experience. In metaphor theory, the domain of literal use is the source domain, while 
the domain of metaphorical use is the target domain.  
This entails that a metaphor is something more than a surface feature of language; it is a cognitive 
operation in which the structures and features of the source domain is used to understand and 
conceptualize the target domain. The career metaphor is therefore not necessarily dependent on use 
of the word “career” itself, but may be expressed with a range of words and phrases that, in 
metaphor theoretical shorthand, relate to the metaphor ILLNESS IS A CAREER. From the perspective of 
metaphor theory, noting that e.g.. drug use and addiction can be understood in terms of career-like 
progression (Becker, 1953) also counts as use of an analytical metaphor.  
Metaphor theory posits that metaphorical connections tend to be established between source 
domains that are concrete, familiar, and highly structured, and target domains that are abstract, 
chaotic and difficult to conceptualize. In such cases, comprehension of the source domain serves as 
an aid to understanding the target domain. For example, the relatively concrete and comprehensible 
domain of journeys and travel may be used to comprehend the much more abstract domain of 
human existence or life with the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Configuring life as a journey is a familiar 
and indeed tired metaphorical strategy, but it is mostly comprehensible and in certain cases very 
useful, insofar as it imposes direction, goals, and a certain degree of predictability in progression.  
Of course, life is not literally a journey. It cannot be lived backwards, and while a person may go on 
several journeys, he or she will only experience one lifetime. This is a crucial postulate in metaphor 
theory. Metaphors aid understanding by simultaneously highlighting and obscuring different aspects 
of both the source and the target domain. It is precisely because of this mechanism that metaphors 
are an effective strategy for comprehension, for if there was perfect overlap between the source and 
target domains (if life was literally like a journey), then there the connection between them would 
yield no new information. 
An analytical metaphor, therefore, ILLNESS IS A CAREER is interesting partly because it diverges from 
another metaphor – the culturally salient understanding that ILLNESS IS WAR. Following both Lakoff & 
Johnson and the seminal essays of Susan Sontag on cancer and AIDS (Sontag, 1991), it has long been 
clear that illness is often viewed, talked about, and thought about, in terms of invasion, conflict, and 
battle. People or their immune systems “fight” against illness, bacteria, and other enemies; they lose 
or win “battles”, they are aided by their doctor “allies” and can be “betrayed” by their own bodies.  
Many common metaphors, with ILLNESS IS WAR as a prime example, have profound implications for 
how we frame complex phenomena. The notion that illness is a conflict confers a considerable 
degree of moral responsibility upon the patient, who is put in the position of having to either carry 
on or give up the fight. Moreover, ILLNESS IS WAR, when seen in conjunction with the hierarchies and 
mechanisms of disease prestige, has troubling implications for many people with chronic illness. 
Chronic illness presents the patient as well as the doctors with a battle that cannot be won and a 
fight that never ends.  
The meaning in metaphors: Recognizing the work of being ill 
Illness is often accompanied by a search for meaning. Often this search takes the form of narrative 
work, in which patients look for a story that give their experiences sense and shape (Frank, 2010; 
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Kleinman, 1989). But narratives, like war, constitute a source domain with certain inherent structures. 
Narratives are finite, and they conventionally have a clearly delimited arc – a beginning and a middle, 
as well as an end. They may be well suited for conceptualizing discrete episodes, but they may be of 
more limited value in conceptualizing illness experience that stretches over a very long time, perhaps 
even a whole lifetime. 
A career, too, must come to an end, although there are people lucky enough to have a career that 
lasts a lifetime. Still, it might be better to replace the metaphor ILLNESS IS A CAREER with the more wide-
ranging metaphor ILLNESS IS WORK. In this metaphor, the “neutral progression” sense of career is 
largely irrelevant, but the “goal-directed progression” sense becomes quite significant. If ILLNESS IS 
WORK – and this is the contention of many scholars, not least Strauss et al. (1982) – then an illness 
career is a possible but not a necessary way to shape one’s understanding of that work; in the source 
domain of WORK, a career is usually distinguished from simply having a job. There is little conflict with 
Goffmann here; both the identity negotiations of patients in mental hospitals and other psychiatric 
settings, and the collaborative efforts of hospitalized patients may be productively seen as work.  
The work associated with illness brings rewards mostly in the form of absence of trouble, rather than 
monetary benefits, but these rewards are no less real. Such work is increasingly seen as a productive 
topic for research; in one taxonomy, it may be classified as belonging to the domains of illness-
specific work, the domain of maintenance of everyday routines, and the domain of emotions and 
personal relationships (Vassilev et al., 2013). In each case, there are benefits to doing the tasks 
associated with each domain, and drawbacks to not doing them. They are forms of goal-directed 
persistent effort, with the possibility of remuneration – not literally, but metaphorically. 
The analytical metaphor ILLNESS IS WORK foregrounds the dynamic and temporal aspects of the illness 
experience. It explains the activities of patients who relate to the ME/CFS complex – their high level 
of engagement in both the public sphere and in medical forums (Knudsen et al., 2012), their 
crowdfunding efforts, and their strong opinions about diagnostic categories and etiologies 
(Bjerkestrand, 2012) – as a way to engage in the meaningful activity of illness career building. The 
Norwegian ME Association, in its statement on the nature of ME, stresses that it “supports a 
biomedical approach to ME [... and has] consistently supported biomedical research, documentation, 
and treatment, as long as they are based on science.” (The Norwegian ME Association, 2012)   
Being sick – specifically, entering into the sick role (Parsons, 1975, 2013; Varul, 2010) – is easily 
framed as a form of retreat into passivity. Outside of periods of incapacitation, however, the illness 
experience may be anything but passive. In the sociology of mental illness, the typical illness career 
may be modeled as a quest “to figure out what is wrong, what to name it, what to do about it, and, 
ultimately, how to live with it” (Aneshensel, 2013, p. 605). This may very well take the form of 
adaptation to a pre-existing medical model. Crucially, however, the career metaphor allows that “a 
number of alternative career paths exist. Many people develop symptoms of psychological disorder 
in some shape or form, but only some become psychiatric patients beset by recurrent episodes of 
impairment.” (Aneshensel, 2013, p. 605)  
The model fits well with ILLNESS IS WORK (though it perhaps underplays the agency of patients). It also 
reflects back upon the connection between illness careers and low disease prestige. The multitude of 
available paths may be central both to the work of mental illness and to the work of ME/CFS. The 
criterion overlap between DSM diagnoses is a highly complex topic in its own right; for these 
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purposes, I will merely note that to a much greater extent than the diagnosis of somatic diseases that 
exhibit clear biomarkers, diagnosis of mental illness entails a clinical choice between partly 
intertwining paths. The ME/CFS diagnostic complex, too, may contain different pathways for the 
same patient, depending both on that patient’s point of entry into the complex (i.e. his or her initial 
contact with a medical professional) and on subsequent developments. Given the lack of diagnostic 
certitude, it is perhaps not surprising that the patients’ experiences are routinely characterized both 
by uncertainty and by strong desire for meaning. ME/CFS illness experiences may thus verbally 
manifest as Arthur Frank’s “chaos narratives” (Frank, 2010), detailing the uncertainty, but also as 
attempts to build a more successful illness career.  
ILLNESS IS WORK and medicalization 
The sociological function of ILLNESS IS WORK is perhaps most clearly seen in light of the World Health 
Organization’s definition of health. If health is the state of “complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (World Health Organization, 1948), 
then we all have illness careers to attend to. Humans are unlikely to win the battle for complete well-
being any time soon; for now, there is work to do.  
Although the case of ME/CFS may turn out to have limited applicability as a template for illness 
career paths, it and the metaphor ILLNESS IS WORK shed further light on the disease prestige hierarchy. 
Somatic, unambiguously located diseases are at the top, while epistemologically problematic chronic 
conditions are at the bottom. If one doesn’t have a disease at the top, then it would perhaps be wise 
to act as if one did – in other words, to dress for the job one wants rather than the job one has. This 
means, generally speaking, striving for medicalization (Conrad, 2008). The phenomenon is culturally 
pervasive, nowhere more so than in psychiatry. Ever since the DSM-III, psychiatry has striven towards 
medicalization, or, to put it another way, towards greater disease prestige by way of medicalization. 
It should not be surprising that patients have picked up on this trend, and that people who enter the 
ME/CFS diagnostic complex recognize that having a somatic illness is in many ways preferable to 
having a psychiatric illness. Greater presumptions of curability might be a factor, as might a lesser 
presumption by others that one is morally responsible for one’s condition – a presumption that 
continues to dog people with psychosomatically explained diagnoses.  
A successful illness career for a person with symptoms consistent with ME/CFS would then consist, if 
not in getting well, then in establishing an understanding of one’s illness where the underlying 
problem is somatic and the onus of improvement is chiefly or entirely on medical professionals 
rather than patients – i.e., where one isn’t “sleeping on the job”. The topics of motivation and patient 
behavioral patterns that hinder or further improvement are common to ME/CFS discourse; cognitive-
behavioral therapy is advanced by many practitioners, and there has been, in Norway, a considerable 
controversy over the Lightning Process, a CBT-inspired commercial course format that is regularly 
promoted as an effective self-management intervention for people with ME/CFS. The actual efficacy 
of the Lightning Process is unclear (Reme, Archer, & Chalder, 2012), but many ME/CFS patients see it 
as potentially harmful and as a threat both to their identities as somatic patients and to potential 
advancement towards other, more effective treatments (Hawkes, 2011). 
Having an illness inevitably involves a large amount of quite literal effort. Some of this effort is 
personal, relating to personal needs and routines. As with many chronic illnesses, the symptoms 
common to ME/CFS, including fatigue, cognitive problems and sensory hypersensitivity, entail that 
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everyday tasks can become very taxing. Some of the effort is relational. Chronic illness means 
ongoing contact not only with many people in the health services, but also with various 
bureaucracies that control quasi-medical services and/or insurance schemes, as well as with 
employers and HR departments (for people working) or with unemployment agencies. Being ill 
requires justification and documentation – the first of one’s rights and relative privileges, the second 
of one’s body and its ailments. These efforts are not minor or casual. They can be demoralizing, 
exhausting, and a cause for despair. Structuring them as work may be a strategy for providing 
meaning where little meaning is apparent. 
Conclusion: The inevitability of illness work and the social function of illness careers 
To health professionals, as Strauss et.al (1982) point out, patient work often reads as compliance. 
Countless micro-interactions between patients and health professionals require patients to move or 
position their bodies in certain ways, to respond to questions or otherwise provide information, to 
cooperate with health professionals who have tasks to complete. But patients with chronic illnesses 
are also responsible for monitoring their condition, initiating contact with health professionals, 
following up when appointments are rescheduled or delayed, i.e. performing administrative work in 
tandem with the health bureaucracies and professionals that they depend upon. “Compliance” does 
not accurately describe these efforts, because they require patients to maintain vigilance and exert 
agency.  
If work is understood as any form of activity that involves mental or physical effort directed at a 
result, then these actions are certainly work. A more restrictive definition might involve, for example, 
effort only in exchange for payment or effort likely to produce surplus value, but even in such cases, 
patient work will still count as work. The payment or surplus value might not be as directly attached 
to the effort as would be true of effort expended at an assembly line, but economic concerns are 
highly relevant both to patients and health care professionals. A patient who does not “comply” or 
cooperate in order to reach treatment goals is likely to be viewed as a problem for the health 
bureaucracy as a whole, and indeed for much of society, unless he or she simply goes away, which is 
rarely the case. 
The point of these observations is that ILLNESS IS WORK may be quite useful in capturing the sense of 
individual responsibility experienced by patients with chronic illness, as well as the need for their 
continuous effort – even, and perhaps particularly, when these are not explicitly recognized by 
others. It may help explain their motivation and actions, including when their actions are or appear 
to be in conflict with professional medical opinion and advice. The notion of a purposeful trajectory 
marks a clear distinction from passive patient roles while recognizing work that is already being 
performed as work. People with chronic illness strive for recognition of their experiences, their 
competence, and their embodied knowledge of themselves and their own illness; this effort may be 
tightly interwoven with the struggle towards health, but does not entail an expectation to become 
free of all illness and experience total well-being.  
The need for an analytical understanding that ILLNESS IS WORK may be particularly strong in cases 
where an illness’ etiology is incomplete or lacking because there are in such cases less recognition of 
patients’ work to begin with. When the medical vocabulary does not explain what is going on, the 
vocabulary of everyday life will have to suffice, but it will not necessarily be a source of recognition in 
a medical setting. In the case of ME/CFS, with salient symptoms such as fatigue, a great deal of 
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patient work is related to everyday life management, rather than e.g. compliance with specific 
medical procedures. Such work may be quite difficult to recognize as work, even if it constitutes 
sustained, significant and purposeful effort over a considerable amount of time. 
In conclusion, the point of this essay has been to recognize that the professionalization of people 
with chronic illness is already a normative force in the world, and thus to name and describe the 
analytical position that ILLNESS IS WORK so it can be both recognized and critiqued. It seems probable 
or at least possible that such recognition may be a good thing for many people with chronic illness, at 
least to the extent that it functions as a conduit for empowerment and self-determination. The 
normative forces that demand patient efforts may also be experienced as oppressive. While the 
classical sick role may be problematic for its association with stigma and suspicion, the active sick 
role, the onus of building an illness career, may place people with chronic illness, when they are at 
their most vulnerable and have the least resources, in a double bind. It should be incumbent upon 
health bureaucracies, services, and professionals, to examine the normative expectations with which 
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